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STATEIVIENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Ronnie Nicholas Radford appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. On appeal, he argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied his due process 
rights when it denied his motion to augment the record, and that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Radford with burglary. (R., p.13.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, the state recommended probation and Radford pied guilty to the charge. 
(R., pp.15-16.) In accordance with the parties' recommendations, the district court 
imposed a unified sentence of five years with one and one-half years fixed, suspended 
the underlying sentence, and placed Radford on four years of probation. (R., pp.27-28.) 
In August 2008, the state alleged that Radford violated his probation by failing to 
report to his probation officer, absconding to Montana, and changing his residence 
without permission. (R., pp.35-36, 45.) Radford admitted the violations and the district 
court ordered a substance abuse evaluation. (R., pp.41-42.) After reviewing the 
evaluator's recommendations, the district court continued Radford on probation with the 
additional terms that he participate in and complete an intensive outpatient treatment 
program, as recommended by the evaluator, and participate in a problem solving court 
as directed by his probation officer. (R., pp.50-52.) 
Complying with the new terms, Radford entered the Family Drug Court, but was 
suspended from that problem solving court in August 2011 because he was missing his 
treatment groups and using illegal substances. (9/12/2011 Tr., p.11, L.10 - p.13, L.9; 
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p.18, Ls.7-17.) Later that month, the state alleged that Radford violated his probation 
by (1) failing to successfully participate in and complete an intensive outpatient 
treatment program, (2) being suspended from the problem solving court, (3) failing to 
complete 100 hours of community service, (4) failing to obtain his GED, (5) leaving his 
assigned district without permission, (6) associating with drug users, and (7) consuming 
alcohol and using drugs. (R., pp.63-65.) Radford admitted the violations alleged in 3-7 
(9/12/2011 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.8, L.22), and after an evidentiary hearing, the district court 
found the violations alleged in 1 and 2 (9/12/2001 Tr., p.22, Ls.8-22). 
The district court revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., 
pp.73-74.) Radford filed a notice of appeal, timely only from the order revoking 
probation and executing the underlying sentence. (R., pp.75-76.) 
Pending appeal, Radford's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment the 
settled record with transcripts from the December 18, 2007 change of plea hearing, the 
January 28, 2008 sentencing hearing, the September 8, 2008 probation violation 
admission hearing, and the October 27, 2008 probation violation disposition hearing. 
(Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support 
Thereof (hereinafter "Motion to Augment"), filed December 29, 2011.) The state 
objected to Radford's motion to augment (Objection to Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend the Briefing Schedule, filed January 6, 2012), and the Idaho Supreme Court 
denied Radford's request for the transcripts (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to 
Suspend The Briefing Schedule (hereinafter "Order Denying Motion to Augment"), filed 
January 20, 2012). 
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ISSUES 
Radford states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Radford due process and 
equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested 
transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to reduce Mr. 
Radford's sentences sua sponte upon revoking probation? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Radford failed to establish that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights by denying his motion to augment the appellate record with 
irrelevant transcripts? 
2. Has Radford failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion by not sua sponte reducing Radford's sentence upon revoking probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Radford's Claim That Denial Of His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With 
Irrelevant Items Was A Due Process Or Equal Protection Violation Is Without Merit 
A. Introduction 
After the appellate record was settled, Radford filed a motion to augment the 
record with various items, including as-yet unprepared transcripts of the January 28, 
2008 sentencing hearing and the September 8, 2008 probation violation admission 
hearing. (Motion to Augment.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied Radford's motion to 
augment. (Order Denying Motion to Augment.) 
Radford now contends that, by denying his motion to augment the appellate 
record with the requested transcripts, the Idaho Supreme Court violated his 
constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, and denied him effective 
assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.4-14.) Radford's argument is 
without merit. Due process and equal protection require the state only to provide a 
record sufficient for appellate review of the errors alleged. Because the denied 
transcripts are not relevant to, much less necessary for, appellate review of the district 
court's order revoking probation (the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction), 
Radford has failed to show any error in the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his motion 
to augment. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one of 
deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free review of 
whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State 
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v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Smith, 135 
Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. Radford Has Failed To Show Any Constitutional Entitlement To The Requested 
Augmentation 
A defendant in a criminal case has a right to "a record on appeal that is sufficient 
for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged regarding the proceedings below." 
State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. 
Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. 
Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)). The state, however, "will not be required to expend its 
funds unnecessarily" to provide transcripts or other items that "will not be germane to 
consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 
U.S. 102, 112 n.5 (1996) ("an indigent defendant is entitled only to those parts of the 
trial record that are germane to consideration of the appeal") (internal citations omitted); 
Lane, 372 U.S. 477; Griffin, 351 U.S. 12. To demonstrate that the record is not 
sufficient, the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his 
ability to pursue the appeal. State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 P.2d 229, 234-
35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 P.2d 893 (1968)). See 
also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002). To show prejudice, 
Radford "must present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were 
requisite to a fair appeal." Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 605 (6th Cir. 2002). Radford has 
failed to carry this burden. 
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Radford's appeal is timely only from the district court's September 20, 2011 
Judgment and Commitment on Conviction of a Probation Violation, which revoked 
probation and executed the underlying sentence. (R., pp.73-74.) Radford argues that 
the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal protection by denying his 
motion to augment the appellate record with the as-yet unprepared transcripts of the 
January 28, 2008 sentencing hearing and the September 8, 2008 probation violation 
admission hearing (Appellant's brief, pp.4-14), but he has failed to explain, much less 
demonstrate, how transcripts of those hearings are necessary to decide the only issue 
over which this Court has jurisdiction on this appeal. There is no evidence that the 
district court had those transcripts in front of it when it revoked probation in September 
2011, nor is there any indication that the court relied upon anything said at the previous 
hearings as a basis for its decision to revoke probation. Because the as-yet unprepared 
transcripts were never presented to the district court at the probation revocation 
hearing, they were never part of the record before the district court and are not properly 
considered for the first time on appeal. See State v. Mitchell, 124 Idaho 374, 376 n.1, 
859 P.2d 972, 974 n.1 (Ct. App. 1993) (in rendering a decision on the issues raised on 
appeal, the appellate court is "limited to review of the record made below" and "will not 
consider new evidence that was never before the trial court"); see also Huerta v. Huerta, 
127 Idaho 77, 80, 896 P.2d 985, 988 (Ct. App. 1995) ("It is not the role of this Court to 
entertain new allegations of fact and consider new evidence."). Radford has failed to 
show how the requested transcripts are relevant to any issue arising from the 
subsequent revocation of probation, the only issue over which this Court has jurisdiction 
on appeal. 
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Radford relies on the Court of Appeals' statement from State v. Hanington, 148 
Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 8 (Ct. App. 2009), that appellate "review [of] a sentence that is 
ordered into execution following a period of probation" is based "upon the facts existing 
when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original 
sentencing and the revocation of probation." (See Appellant's brief, p.11.) Hanington 
does not support Radford's claim of entitlement to the requested transcripts because 
Hanington does not stand for the proposition that a merits-based review of a trial court's 
decision to order a sentence executed following a period of probation requires 
preparation and inclusion in the appellate record of transcripts of every hearing over 
which the trial court presided. To the contrary, the law is well established that, absent a 
showing that evidence was presented at prior hearings, and/or that the district court 
relied on such evidence in reaching its decision to revoke probation, an appellant is not 
entitled to transcription at public expense of every hearing conducted before the date 
probation was finally revoked. Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) 
(state is not "required to expend its funds unnecessarily" where "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript ... will not be germane to consideration of the appeal") (citation 
and internal quotations omitted); Draper, 372 U.S. at 496 ("the fact that an appellant 
with funds may choose to waste his money by unnecessarily including in the record all 
of the transcripts does not mean that the State must waste its funds by providing what is 
unnecessary for adequate appellate review."); see also Strand, 137 Idaho at 462-63, 50 
P.3d at 477-78 (indigent appellant challenging denial of Rule 35 motion not entitled to 
transcription at public expense of Rule 35 hearing at which no evidence was presented). 
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Although there may be some circumstances that require the inclusion in the 
appellate record of transcripts of prior hearings to fully review a trial court's decision to 
revoke probation, Radford has failed to show that any such circumstances apply here. 
Radford has failed to point to anything in the record that would indicate that what 
happened at the January 2008 sentencing hearing and the September 2008 probation 
violation admission hearing were considered or played any role in the district court's 
decision in September 2011 to revoke probation. Radford has therefore failed to show 
that the transcripts are necessary to complete an adequate record on this appeal. 
Citing Mayer v. City of Chicago, Radford also claims that if he can make a 
"colorable argument" that he needs an "item" or "items" to complete a record, the 
burden transfers to the state "to prove that the requested items are not necessary for 
the appeal." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) He also argues, with no citation whatsoever, that 
"to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection," the state 
must provide him (and all indigent defendants) with whatever appellate record he 
desires unless the state proves that "some or all of the requested materials are 
unnecessary or frivolous." (Appellant's brief, p.6; see also p.4 ("The only way a court 
can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if 
the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.").) No reading of 
Mayer supports these arguments. 
Mayer was convicted on non-felony charges punishable only by a fine and he 
appealed, challenging the sufficiency of evidence and asserting a claim of prosecutorial 
misconduct. Mayer at 190. The appellate court denied his request for a trial transcript 
at government expense on the basis of a local rule providing that verbatim transcripts of 
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trial proceedings would be provided at government expense only for felonies. kt at 
191-93. The issue was not whether Mayer was entitled to a record of his trial, but 
whether he was entitled to a verbatim transcript of his trial. kt at 193. The Court noted 
it had addressed a similar issue in Draper v. Washington, where the Court held that the 
government need not provide transcripts that were not "germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194 (quoting Draper, 372 U.S. at 495-96). 
However, "the State must provide a full verbatim record where that is necessary to 
assure the indigent as effective an appeal as would be available to the defendant with 
resources to pay his own way." kt at 195. "Moreover, where the grounds of appeal, as 
in this case, make out a colorable need for a complete transcript, the burden is on the 
State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an 'alternative' will suffice for an 
effective appeal on those grounds." kt 
Thus, if it is not clear on the existing record, an indigent appellant must establish 
that a record of certain "proceedings" is germane to the appeal. kt at 194. Only after 
the germaneness of the requested record of the proceedings is established and a 
colorable need for a verbatim record is shown by the appellant will the burden shift to 
the state to demonstrate that a partial transcript or some record other than a verbatim 
transcript will be adequate. kt at 194-95. See also Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 
226, 227-28 (1971) (in deciding whether a requested record is necessary, the Court 
should consider the "value of the transcript to the defendant in connection with the 
appeal," but the standard does not require "a showing of need tailored to the facts of the 
particular case" and the Court may take notice of the importance of a transcript). 
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Here the only proceeding challenged on appeal is the revocation of probation on 
September 20, 2011. The record related to the district court's decision to revoke 
probation is complete. Radford has failed to establish that the requested transcripts are 
necessary to create an adequate appellate record to review the court's order revoking 
probation. Nothing in the record suggests that the transcripts Radford requested in his 
augmentation were before the district court in relation to his probation violation hearing. 
Because Radford failed to make a showing of germaneness and colorable need for the 
requested transcripts, there is no burden on the state. Because all of the evidence 
before the district court is in the appellate record, that record is adequate for appellate 
review, and Radford has failed to establish a violation of his due process rig hts. 1 
Strand, 137 Idaho at 463, 50 P.3d at 478. 
Radford has also failed to establish that denial of his request to augment the 
record on appeal with irrelevant transcripts denied him equal protection. Radford cites 
to several cases where criminal defendants were denied appellate records because of 
their indigence. (See Appellant's brief, pp.6-11 (citing, ~. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12 (1956); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 
(1963).) However, there is nothing in the record that in any way indicates that the Idaho 
Supreme Court denied Radford's request for the transcripts solely because he is 
indigent. In fact, Radford's motion would have properly been denied even if he had the 
1 As a component of his due process claim, Radford also argues that the denial of his 
motion to augment the record with the requested transcripts has deprived him of 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-14.) Because 
Radford has failed to show that the requested transcripts are necessary, or even 
relevant, for appellate review of the district court's order revoking probation, there is no 
possibility that the denial of the motion to augment has deprived Radford of effective 
assistance of counsel on this appeal. 
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funds to pay for the transcripts. The Idaho Appellate Rules require any party seeking 
augmentation to set forth a ground sufficient to justify the augmentation requested. 
I.A.R. 30. Radford's motion to augment failed because he failed to meet this minimal 
burden, imposed upon all parties, of showing that the transcripts were necessary or 
even helpful in addressing appellate issues. The Idaho Supreme Court's order properly 
denied the motion to augment because Radford failed to make a showing that any 
appellant-indigent or otherwise-would be entitled to augment the record as 
requested. The rule applies to all parties, not just the indigent. 
Radford is entitled to a record adequate for appellate review of the district court's 
order revoking probation and nothing more. He has failed to show that the requested 
transcripts are relevant to appellate review, much less that they are necessary for 
adequate appellate review. Having failed to make any such showing, his motion to 
augment the record with irrelevant transcripts that were never before the district court is 
properly denied. Having failed to show that his due process and equal protection rights 
were implicated, much less violated, by that denial, Radford has failed to show any 
basis for relief. 
11. 
Radford Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion 
A Introduction 
After multiple probation violations, the district court decided that probation was 
not fulfilling the objective of rehabilitation and Radford would have a better chance at 
success under confinement with a recommendation for the therapeutic community. 
(9/12/2011 Tr., p.28, Ls.3-17; p.29, Ls.14-19.) The district court therefore revoked 
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probation and imposed Radford's underlying sentence. (R., pp.73-74.) Radford does 
not challenge the district court's decision to revoke probation and impose the underlying 
sentence. Rather, Radford argues that the district court abused its discretion by not sua 
sponte reducing his sentence when it revoked probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) 
Radford has failed to establish an abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 
131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499, 
873 P.2d 144 (1994)). 
C. Radford Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Not Sua Sponte Reducing His Underlying Sentence Upon Revoking Probation 
The district court may, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35, reduce an underlying 
sentence sua sponte upon revoking probation. I.C.R. 35. A court's decision not to 
reduce a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established 
standards governing whether a sentence is excessive. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 
26, 27, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009); State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 978, 783 P.2d 
315, 317 (Ct. App. 1989)). Where a sentence is legal, those standards require an 
appellant to establish that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 
136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 
11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden, the appellant must show that the sentence is 
excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 
615. A sentence is reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of 
protecting society, and any or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, 
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rehabilitation, or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 
(1978). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its view of a 
reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 
565,568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Radford has failed to show that his sentence is excessive. In the underlying 
case, Radford broke into an automotive shop and helped his brother-in-law steal a 
transfer case, numerous tools, car stereos and speakers. (PSI, p.2.) Radford admitted 
his crime and helped police with their investigation. (PSI, p.3.) For his crime, Radford 
could have received a sentence of up to ten years in prison. I. C. § 18-1403. However, 
Radford instead received an underlying sentence of five years with only one and one-
half years fixed, and was offered the chance at four years of probation. (R., pp.27-28.) 
As part of that probation, during those four years, Radford was required to complete 100 
hours of community service and obtain his GED. {R., p.28.) 
Radford was not a model probationer. Less than a year after sentencing, 
Radford violated his probation by failing to report to his probation officer, absconding to 
Montana, and changing his residence without permission. (R., pp.35-36, 45.) The 
district court ordered a substance abuse evaluation. (R., pp.41-42.) After reviewing the 
evaluator's recommendations, the district court continued Radford on probation with the 
additional terms that he participate in and complete an intensive outpatient treatment 
program, as recommended by the evaluator, and participate in a problem solving court 
as directed by his probation officer. (R., pp.50-52.) Radford failed to fulfill the new 
terms of his probation. While he initially entered Family Drug Court, he later was 
suspended because he was missing his treatment groups and using illegal substances. 
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(9/12/2011 Tr., p.11, L.10 - p.13, L.9; p.18, Ls.7-17; p.22, Ls.8-22.) He also failed to 
complete 100 hours of community service, never obtained his GED, left his assigned 
district without permission, associated with drug users, and used alcohol and drugs, all 
in violation of his probation. (R., pp.63-65; 9/12/2011 Tr., p.6, L.11 - p.8, L.22.) 
Now on appeal, Radford argues that the district court inadequately weighed 
allegedly mitigating factors when crafting his underlying sentence, such as Radford 
joining a criminal design rather than concocting one, his ongoing substance abuse, and 
support of family. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-17.) None of these shows an abuse of 
discretion. First, most of these factors are hardly mitigating. Whether Radford was the 
leader or follower in the burglary is irrelevant because he is still a principal in the 
commission of the burglary. I.C. § 18-204. Radford's substance abuse is also not a 
mitigating factor as there is no argument that he committed his crime because he was 
on drugs. Cf. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91,645 P.2d 323,325 (1982). Second, even 
if they were mitigating, there is no indication that the district court did not consider such 
factors when it elected to give Radford an opportunity at probation with a relatively 
lenient underlying sentence rather than immediately execute a lengthy sentence for the 
serious crime of burglary. 
"The purpose of probation is rehabilitation." State v. Wilson, 127 Idaho 506, 510, 
903 P.2d 95, 99 (Ct. App. 1995). Radford's probation was not fulfilling that purpose. 
Any cause satisfactory to the court, which indicates that probation is not meeting its 
goals, is enough to justify revocation. kl at 510, 903 P.2d at 99. The district court 
properly exercised its discretion by revoking Radford's probation and executing his 
underlying sentence. Radford has failed to show an abuse of the district court's 
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discretion in executing that underlying sentence without reduction. The district court's 
order revoking probation and executing Radford's underlying sentence should be 
affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence. 
DATED this 31st day of May, 2012. 
c~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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